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vMobilizing additional finance to meet the challenges of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) is an urgent priority. Developing countries are mobilizing resources
themselves to meet the MDG targets by 2015, but they will fall short without additional
external flows. Increased private and public money is needed in order for the world’s
poorest countries to invest in the basic services and infrastructure necessary for human
development, and to improve livelihoods and employment for poor people.
As a result of the Five Year Review of the World Summit for Social Development, the
UN General Assembly in September 2000 adopted a resolution calling for ‘a rigorous
analysis of the advantages, disadvantages and other implications of proposals for
developing new and innovative sources of funding, both public and private, for
dedication to social development and poverty eradication programmes’. The UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs in turn requested the World Institute for
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) in Helsinki to undertake a project
on ‘Innovative Sources for Development Finance’.
This Policy Brief summarizes the key findings of the study carried out by UNU-
WIDER. Anthony B. Atkinson, Project Director and Warden of Nuffield College,
University of Oxford, has written the Policy Brief drawing on the papers prepared for
the project. He acknowledges the substantial contribution made by the project authors,
but takes full responsibility for the opinions expressed. The papers are published in the
volume New Sources of Development Finance by Oxford University Press, 2004. The
contents of the volume are listed at the end of this Policy Brief.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), substantial additional
external funding needs to be mobilized. Estimates differ, but a ‘ballpark’ figure is an
annual increase of US$50 billion. This could be achieved by a doubling of official
development assistance (ODA). Welcome steps have been made in that direction, but
this takes time, and time is of the essence. For this reason alone, it is necessary to
consider new sources.
Here we consider seven new sources:
• Global environmental taxes (carbon-use tax);
• Tax on currency flows (the ‘Tobin tax’);
• Creation of new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs);
• International Finance Facility (IFF);
• Increased private donations for development;
• Global lottery and global premium bond; and
• Increased remittances from emigrants.
Some of the proposals have multiple objectives. The creation of SDRs was first
proposed to ease problems of international liquidity, but here we are concerned with
their potential role for development purposes. The Tobin tax was initially advocated as a
means of reducing financial volatility, and taxes on energy use are proposed to slow
down global warming. In this sense, the taxes can be said to generate a ‘double
dividend’. However, our primary concern is with the revenue that they could generate
for development.
The first conclusion is that the two global taxes considered could yield revenue of the
magnitude required (tax on carbon use) or at least half of the requirement (the Tobin
tax). Moreover, the tax rates required for this purpose are an order of magnitude smaller
than the tax rates proposed by those advocating these taxes on allocational grounds. The
Tobin taxes, proposed to discourage excessive currency speculation, have been 10 or 20
basis points, whereas here we envisage a rate of 2 basis points. The energy tax
considered here has a rate of one-tenth or one-twentieth of those typically considered in
the literature on global warming. The new taxes cannot, therefore, be expected to have a
major behavioural impact, discouraging speculation and reducing CO2 emissions. The
idea of a double dividend should not be over-sold. But the much more modest tax rates
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envisaged here are more likely to be politically acceptable and less likely to have
disruptive economic consequences.
There are alternatives to global taxation. The International Finance Facility proposed by
the UK government could, if it attracts sufficient support from other major donors, yield
flows over the crucial period up to 2015 of the magnitude required. (Although it is open
to question how far this differs at heart from a commitment to expand ODA.) The
creation of SDRs for development purposes has been envisaged as raising some US$25-
30 billion. This means that it could contribute a significant part of the total, but would
need to be combined with other measures, particularly if such allocations were made
less frequently than annually. One such additional source is the global lottery, which is
potentially the source of significant revenues, if agreement can be reached with national
lotteries. A global premium bond could provide a flow of loan funding not otherwise
available. Supporting roles could be played by increased remittances from emigrants,
and, on a more modest scale, increased private donations.
In each case, however, we have to consider the extent of additionality. There is a distinct
risk of crowding out. Countries signing up to the International Finance Facility may
implicitly offset this commitment against their regular ODA. The same may apply to
countries that transfer any new SDR allocation. Agreement to the introduction of a
global tax may mean that governments feel less pressure to increase their ODA, or that
firms are less likely to contribute to charitable funding of development. Measures to
stimulate private donations may adversely affect other forms of giving. Issuing a global
premium bond may crowd out other borrowing for development purposes, although this
is less likely if it is targeted at the individual investor.
With all the proposals for new sources, one has to ask—who pays? There are good
reasons to expect that new global taxes will be passed on to final users. This applies to
energy taxes. People tend to think immediately of the impact of a carbon tax on the fuel
and transport costs of households, but energy costs enter also as inputs in other sectors.
The operating costs of the financial sector, for example, will be increased, so that part
may appear as higher prices for apparently unrelated products. In the case of the Tobin
tax, one disadvantage is that the final incidence is not easily determined. Part of the
burden may well fall on developing countries: for instance if the tax reduces the
effective flow of remittances from emigrants. The other measures too may have costs.
The increase in ODA that is effectively envisaged under the International Finance
Facility has to be financed, and the future commitments may affect the budgetary
position of donor countries. It is illusory to suppose that simply adopting an alternative
funding route avoids all cost.
There are serious barriers to the enactment of the proposals for new sources of funding.
In part, these obstacles can be overcome by re-design to make the proposals more
compelling. In the case of the global lottery, for instance, the prize structure can be
constructed in a way that helps differentiate the product from that of national lotteries
and to avoid the possibly negative effects of very large prizes. Any realistic programme
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is likely to consist of a package of measures. While a carbon tax alone might be
sufficient to raise the required funds, this is not true of the other proposals considered
here. Judicious crafting of such a package can make its introduction more likely.
Overcoming the obstacles is primarily a matter for political action. Who are the key
actors? To begin with, there is an essential role for the individual citizen. Individuals can
contribute significantly by their private support and by their influence on governments.
Individuals make generous donations to charity, but relatively little goes to development
purposes. Increased support for development charities serves both the direct purpose of
helping poor countries and the indirect purpose of demonstrating to governments of rich
countries the concerns of their voters.
National governments are, indeed, crucial. First, they have considerable independent
impact. Acting alone, the government of a rich country can take steps to increase the
flows of finance for development. A single country could, for example, allow income
tax deductions for taxpayers sending remittances to fund community projects. A single
country could launch a premium bond dedicated to development funding. A single
country could decide to allocate to development purposes part of the proceeds from its
national lottery. A single country could match out of public funds the amounts donated
by its citizens to development charities.
Matching also applies at the international level, and governments may be more willing
to provide funding where other countries are also participating. The logic of the
International Finance Facility is that a number of countries join together in making the
commitment. This brings us to the class of proposals where common action is required
but it is sufficient for a significant subset of countries to agree. This includes the
International Finance Facility and the global lottery. Finally, there are those proposals
where the involvement of all donor countries is effectively necessary. This includes the
creation of new SDRs and (probably) the carbon tax.
Our focus has been on the role of high-income countries, but our report is not directed
only at these countries. Middle-income countries are becoming increasingly significant
as potential sources of development funding. There is much that developing countries
can do to facilitate the effective enactment of the proposals considered here and to take
forward the necessary dialogue. Urgent action on all sides is imperative.
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A FRAMEWORK
Two powerful and divergent forces grip the world at present. On the one hand the
effectiveness of international organizations has been called into question. The role and
functioning of the United Nations is much debated. Some nations exhibit frustration
with multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, the recognition is being cemented that
a global economy requires global institutions. International organizations are viewed by
many as the key to the free movement of goods, services and capital. We have seen the
adoption of ambitious development targets in the form of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Donor countries have pledged increases in official development
assistance (ODA).
The tension between these two forces pervades discussion of resources for world
development. On the one hand, there is talk of ‘donor fatigue’. Ratification is blocked of
the amendment to the IMF Articles allowing a special allocation of Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs). Proposals for global taxation meet immediate opposition from powerful
elements in the US Congress. On the other hand, there is widespread appreciation of the
need for new resource flows to allow the MDGs to be achieved. There are interesting
new proposals for revenue sources such as a global lottery or the International Finance
Facility (IFF). Individuals continue to support development charities. US billionaires are
personally funding development and world health activities.
The direction taken at this juncture will depend largely on political events and political
decisions. But sober economic analysis has an important role to play. This project on
‘Innovative Sources of Development Finance’, undertaken at the request of the United
Nations, examines a range of sources of new development funding. The ideas are not
necessarily new. The proposal for a Tobin tax on currency transactions, for instance, has
been on the table for more than 30 years. But the project report provides a new analysis
and sets the different ideas in a common analytical framework based on the application
of modern public economics. Moreover, it discusses some proposals of recent origin,
such as the IFF devised by the UK government, and comes up with one totally novel
suggestion, a global premium bond.
Innovative sources to meet a global challenge
At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the member-states of the United Nations
affirmed their continued commitment to sustained development and the eradication of
poverty. They set out a vision of a global partnership for development, directed at the
achievement of specific targets. Specifically, the world’s leaders signed up to the MDGs
summarized in Box 1. The concrete goals include the halving by 2015 of the proportion
of people living in extreme poverty, of the proportion hungry, and of the proportion
lacking access to safe drinking water. The objectives include the achievement of
New Sources of Development Finance: Funding the Millennium Development Goals—A Policy Brief
5
universal primary education and gender equality in education, the achievement by 2015
of a three-fourths decline in maternal mortality and a two-thirds decline in mortality
among children under five. They include halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS
and providing special assistance to AIDS orphans, while improving the lives of 100
million slum dwellers.
BOX 1
SUMMARY OF MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Goal 1
Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger
• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people
whose income is less than US$1 a day.
• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people
who suffer from hunger.
Goal 2
Achieve universal primary education
• Ensure that by 2015 all children will be able to complete
a full course of primary schooling.
Goal 3
Promote gender equality
and empower women
• Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education
by 2015.
Goal 4
Reduce child mortality
• Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the
under-5 mortality rate.
Goal 5
Improve maternal health
• Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015,
the maternal mortality ratio.
Goal 6
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread
of HIV/AIDS.
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread
of malaria and other major diseases.
Goal 7
Ensure environmental sustainability
• Integrate principles of sustainable development into
country policies and reverse the loss of environmental
resources.
• Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without
sustainable access to safe drinking water.
• Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement
in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
Goal 8
Develop a global partnership for
development
• Develop the world trading and financial system.
• Address the special needs of the least developed
and landlocked and small island countries.
• Deal comprehensively with the debt problems
of developing countries.
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Since the declaration of the MDGs, a number of attempts have been made to estimate
the financing requirements. At a global level, the Report of the Panel chaired by
President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico estimated conservatively that an additional US$50
billion would be required annually to achieve the international development goals. In
addition to the financing needs of individual poor nations, there is also the necessity to
finance global public goods. The Zedillo Panel argued that there was a strong case for
international financing of global public goods, and identified the goods that fell in that
category such as peacekeeping; the prevention of contagious diseases; research into
tropical medicines, vaccines, and agricultural crops; the prevention of chlorofluoro-
carbon emissions, the limitation of carbon emissions, and the preservation of
biodiversity. The UK government estimated that to achieve universal primary schooling
needs some US$10 billion more each year; that to reduce infant and maternal mortality
requires an extra US$12 billion a year, and that halving world poverty requires an
investment of up to US$20 billion a year. All such figures are estimates, and involve
matters of judgement, but it seems reasonable for present purposes to take a figure of an
additional US$50 billion as being required annually to achieve the international
development goals. This is the ‘ballpark’ figure used here.
BOX 2
INNOVATIVE SOURCES OF DEVELOPMENT FUNDING CONSIDERED HERE
Source
Global environmental taxes Tax on goods generating environmental externalities, with specific
reference to a tax on use of hydrocarbon fuels according to their
carbon content.
Currency transactions tax
(‘Tobin tax’)
Tax on foreign currency transactions, collected on a national or a
market basis, covering a range of transactions to be defined (spot,
forward, future, swaps and other derivatives).
Creation of new Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs)
Creation of SDRs for development purposes, with donor countries
making their SDR allocation available to fund development
International Finance Facility (IFF) Long-term, but conditional, funding guaranteed to the poorest
countries by the donor countries. Long-term pledges of a flow of
annual payments to the IFF would leverage additional money from
the international capital markets.
Increased private donations
for development
Charitable donations by private individuals and firms. Measures to
encourage private funding of development: tax incentives, global
funds, corporate giving, and the Internet.
Global lottery or global premium
bond
Global lottery operated through national state-operated and state-
licensed lotteries, with proceeds shared between national
participants and an independent foundation established in
conjunction with UN. Global premium bond, parallel to national
bonds with lottery prizes.
Increased remittances
from emigrants
Logistics (reducing cost of remittances), financial institutions
(encouraging repatriation) and citizenship rather than residence
basis for taxation.
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The aim here is to investigate ways in which such additional resources can be financed.
How can we find an extra US$50 billion for development funding? Our focus is on
flows of resources from high-income to developing countries. In so concentrating, we
are not denying the importance of resources channelled into development by developing
countries themselves; nor are we seeking to under-play the potentially significant
contribution of middle-income countries to development funding. A second delimitation
is that our primary concern is with the funding side, not with the spending side. The two
sides cannot of course be fully separated: uses of resources may affect their availability.
But our ultimate objective in this report is to analyse possible sources of funds.
The proposals considered here are summarized in Box 2. They cover a wide range,
including global taxes but also other sources. They differ in the degree to which they
would represent a radical departure. In some cases, such as private donations or
remittances by emigrants, the aim is to raise the scale of already existing flows of
resources. In other cases, such as the IFF, a new mechanism would have to be put in
place. Both global taxes and the global lottery/premium bond would be fundamental
departures.
It will be evident that our coverage is far from exhaustive. In the case of global taxes,
there are a number of other candidates: a ‘brain drain’ tax, an international air transport
tax, taxation of ocean fishing, taxation of arms exports, an Internet tax, and a luxury
goods tax. Each of these warrants examination. We are not arguing that the global taxes
investigated here are superior to those not covered. Rather we have taken two of the
most widely discussed—the Tobin tax and environmental taxes—as examples of
possible global taxes. Similarly, it should be stressed that the coverage of non-fiscal
measures is not exhaustive. We do not, for example, cover measures to raise capital
funds in developed countries or measures to leverage the funds arising from trade. Nor
do we consider the important role of foreign direct investment.
Global taxes require agreement by national governments. The proposal for a new round
of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) requires high-income countries to agree to make
these available for development purposes. The UK government proposal for an
International Finance Facility in effect involves a pre-commitment of future ODA in a
way that allows leveraging on the capital market. In contrast, the remaining three
schemes involve a degree of voluntary choice by individuals. The choices range from a
voluntary transfer, as where people give their small change to UNICEF or make regular
payments to Oxfam, to buying tickets in a global lottery, where the transfer of profits to
development purposes is only a subsidiary motive. It includes proposals to increase the
remittances sent home by workers abroad that can increase the flow of resources
available for development.
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FIGURE 1
WHAT ROLE FOR NEW SOURCES?
Starting Point
New sources
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FIGURE 2
FISCAL ARCHITECTURE: NATIONAL TAXATION
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Individual taxpayer
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Tax collection
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The role of new sources
Each of the proposals outlined in Box 2 raises distinct issues, and these are considered
in the separate sections below. But one of the contributions of the report is to bring out a
number of over-arching issues. First, there is the relation with ODA. The target of an
additional US$50 billion could be achieved by a doubling of ODA, and a number of
donor countries have recently pledged to increase the proportion of their national
income devoted to ODA. If all donors reached the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP,
then the search for new sources would become redundant. Welcome steps have been
made in the direction of increasing aid flows, but this takes time, and time is of the
essence. For this reason alone, it is necessary to consider new sources, as we do here.
In debating the merits of new sources of development funding, and contrasting them
with increased ODA, there is risk of confusion. We need to distinguish carefully two
different comparisons. The first is between the current position, labelled ‘Starting Point
(O)’ in Figure 1, and a situation, labelled ‘New sources (A)’ in Figure 1, where there are
new sources raising US$50 billion to fund the MDGs. We are then comparing the
economic costs of the tax with the benefits from the MDG funding (the comparison
shown by the dashed line in Figure 1). To argue against the new sources, one would
have to say that the cost is too great, compared with the benefits from achieving the
MDGs. The second comparison is between new sources raising US$50 billion, labelled
‘New sources (A)’ in Figure 1 and increased ODA of the same amount, labelled point B
in Figure 1. We are then holding constant the contribution to development funding and
considering different methods of financing. (This is the comparison of A with B shown
by the dotted line in Figure 1.) It would be a legitimate argument against the new
sources to say that their cost is too great, compared with the cost of raising the domestic
taxes necessary to fund the increased ODA by donors.
Global public finance
How far can we bring to bear on the funding of the MDGs the accumulated knowledge
in the field of national public finance? One interesting point of departure is to consider
the taxes and transfers that might be instituted by a world government. There is no
possibility of such an institution being created in the relevant timeframe, but it provides
a reference point to illuminate the actual policy issues. It may also serve as a moral
challenge.
If such a global government were to act in the interests of world citizens as a whole,
then global welfare maximization is likely to imply substantial positive taxes on almost
everyone in richer countries and substantial transfers to the majority of people in low-
income countries. It is important here to distinguish between low-income people and
low-income countries, since there are obviously well-off people living in poor countries
and these well-off people would be expected to be taxpayers. Within rich countries,
optimal tax scheme does not necessarily mean higher marginal rates of tax. The greater
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transfers could be accomplished by raising the average tax rate, for example by cutting
the tax thresholds. One implication is that much of the cost of increased transfers could
fall on those in the middle of the distribution in rich countries (and on those in
middle-income countries), since those in the middle ranges account for a large fraction
of total income. On the other hand, there has been a major shift in the distribution of
income towards the top in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom. The share of the top 1 per cent in the US has doubled in 20 years.
There is much greater scope for raising tax revenue from the globally rich.
This brings us to the political economy of new sources. The feasibility of new sources of
funding for development is ultimately a political issue; and we have to consider not only
how a government should behave but also how governments do behave. What is the
likelihood of different proposals being adopted? How can they be designed to increase
their political acceptability at a global level?
Lessons from fiscal federalism
Any foreseeable global tax will be introduced, not by a unitary world government, but as
the result of concerted action by nation states. This leads one to ask what lessons can be
drawn from fiscal relations in federal states. Within many countries, there are sub-
national governments with independent fiscal responsibilities. Indeed, a number of these
nation states emerged as a result of the voluntary association of previously independent
states. The parallel is, of course, inexact. The economic, social, cultural and institutional
differences among nations are more pronounced than those within the typical federation.
There are, however, interesting lessons. The fiscal powers of sub-governments mean
that we cannot envisage taxing people independently of their fiscal residence. The
notion of distributional justice that can be pursued in a federation is that of inter-state
equity, with fiscal equalization being carried out between governments.
What may induce individual governments to back new sources for development
funding? We start from a position where donor countries make significant transfers via
ODA and where the citizens of those countries make private donations. The co-
existence of public and private transfers means that either the government is not
providing aid of the quantity and/or type that its electorate prefers or that there are
differences of views among voters. Citizens cannot spend less than their government
chooses, but they can add private transfers to official aid. How, in such a context, can
we interpret the impact of the adoption of the MDG? Have donor governments moved
closer to the level of ODA that their voters preferred? In that case, we might expect the
expansion of public transfers to be partially offset by a scaling back of private donations.
Have governments sought to bring about a shift in public opinion in favour of increased
support for development? In this case, we may even see an increased flow of private
donations.
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Fiscal architecture
If the new sources require government action (as we have noted, not all do), then does
the success and effectiveness of any particular proposal depend on complete adhesion of
all donor countries? The natural instinct of many people is to assume that there is an
inherent free-rider problem and that there has to be general, if not universal, agreement.
In the present climate, with multilateralism under question, this presumption provides
grounds for pessimism about the chances of making progress. On the other hand,
suppose that we start from the position that universal agreement may be impossible and
examine the implications of going ahead with a subset of countries. The US has so far
prevented the creation by the IMF of Special Drawing Rights, and in this case no action
seems possible. But it does not follow that other measures are also blocked. With the
other six proposals, it would be possible, at least theoretically, for progress to be made
even without the agreement of all major countries. Here we can learn from the internal
experience of the European Union (EU). The EU has in the past faced situations where
one member state chose to ‘opt out’ of collective decisions. In these circumstances,
flexibility in the resulting institutions has allowed the majority to respect the opting-out
decision but still make progress towards the majority objectives. There is ‘flexible
geometry’. Partial adhesion has costs, but the issue becomes one of balance, rather than
an absolute block on action.
In the case of a global tax, we have to ask how it would be administered. A typical flow
chart for national taxation is shown in Figure 2. National governments determine the
rates of taxation and the taxbase. Individual taxpayers pay the taxes to the government,
which both enforces payment and is in turn accountable to the electorate. Many taxes
involve intermediary agents. The individual taxpayer is shown in Figure 2, for example,
as paying the aircraft departure tax to the airline, which then accounts for the revenue to
the government.
One evidently cannot apply exactly the same process to global taxation (Figure 3). We
have both global institutions and national governments, and it is the latter which have to
agree to the taxes being levied and which are accountable to their electorates. It could
indeed be the case that the global tax is treated as simply a glorified domestic tax, with
the revenue being forwarded by national governments to a global spending body (the
solid lines in Figure 3). But there are more possibilities, as shown by the dashed and
dotted lines. If there were an international air transport tax determined at the global
level, then the airline could transfer the money, not to the national government, but to a
global tax authority, in which case the new source of finance would bring a new actor
into play. The dashed lines in Figure 3 show this. Whether or not such a world tax
authority is envisaged is one of the questions that have to be considered. Moving in the
opposite direction from the introduction of a world tax authority is the case shown by
dotted lines in Figure 3, where national governments retain not only control over the
administration of the tax process but also discretion over the tax rates. In this case,
participating governments would agree on their national tax liability but retain freedom
to decide how the revenue is to be raised. This would in effect be applying the principle
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of subsidiarity adopted by the European Union. To give a concrete illustration, suppose
that the participating governments agree that each country should pay a tax related to
national carbon emissions. This determines the amount that each participating country
has to pay, but the national government would remain free to raise the revenue in
whatever manner it thought fit. The national government might consider, for example,
that a tax on air journeys was unfair on those living in remote rural areas, and choose for
domestic reasons a different taxbase. We would then have a two-tier structure, with the
national tax obligation requirement being agreed multilaterally, but the tax
implementation being chosen locally. Countries with more emissions would pay more
total tax, but this would not necessarily mean higher fuel taxes. Income tax or a broad-
based value-added tax could be raised instead. One reason why, under the subsidiarity
architecture, a national government may choose a different taxbase is that it faces
political opposition to a particular form of taxation. The fuel tax protests of 2000 in
Europe provide a good illustration.
FIGURE 3
FISCAL ARCHITECTURE IN A GLOBAL SETTING
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PROPOSED SOURCES OF FUNDING
Global environmental taxes
The taxation of environmental externalities is an obvious potential source of revenue,
not least because—as discussed later—such taxes are often thought to give rise to a
‘double dividend’, both generating revenue and helping reduce environmental damage.
Much of the economics literature relates to taxes as instruments of national policy.
There are, however, useful lessons for global environmental taxes. Calculation of the
optimal tax should include an element that reflects the marginal environmental damage
(external diseconomy) associated with an activity, such as the consumption of fuel. The
tax should be targeted as far as possible to directly influence the activities and to be
neutral with respect to other decisions. The main alternative to taxes is the use of
quantitative regulations and quotas. The auction of tradable emission permits may,
under certain conditions, generate the same revenue and be as effective in reducing
pollution.
Moving to a global level, one has to ask why, if a carbon use tax would reduce external
diseconomies, is this not already reflected in domestic taxes? One response is that the
dividend is in part global rather than national. National governments may not impose
sufficient corrective taxes because the benefits accrue disproportionately outside their
boundaries. A switch from general taxation to carbon use taxation may be a positive
sum game globally but a negative sum game nationally. There may, therefore, be a case
for a supplementary global tax. Does this mean that the global tax should be levied at
the same rate on all countries? To the extent that emissions impose environmental
damage wherever they occur, the corrective tax should be the same. However, this needs
to be moderated to take account of the unequal distribution of world income—the very
reason for our current interest in the tax. Considerations of global justice point to poor
countries bearing less of the cost burden, and may justify the tax being levied only on
high-income or middle-income countries.
A global tax on carbon use at a rate equivalent to a tax on gasoline of 4.8 cents per US
gallon (approximately €0.01 per litre) levied only on high-income countries could
indeed raise some US$50 billion a year. Such a rate of global tax would represent a very
small addition to those applied by many national governments, and is an order of
magnitude smaller than the increases considered in proposals to halt global warming.
How is this potential argument for additional environmental taxation affected by the
fiscal architecture? We are presupposing that the tax is indeed levied on individuals and
firms in the form of a carbon levy (or another environmental taxbase). Suppose,
however, that we have subsidiarity, where the burden on national governments is
determined by their carbon emissions, but the national governments are free to decide
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how to raise the revenue. As noted above, they may for political or other reasons choose
another taxbase. It is still, however, the case that the government faces a financial
incentive to reduce its emissions by other policies, such as auctioning emission permits
or regulation.
The Tobin tax
The second major proposal for global taxation considered here is that for a currency
transactions tax (CTT): the celebrated Tobin tax. James Tobin first put forward the idea
for a currency transactions tax as a means of combating financial volatility. The
potential of the currency transactions tax as a generator of revenue was suggested as a
by-product. Here we focus on the by-product: the Tobin tax as a source of revenue for
development. One important difference is that we are talking about much lower rates of
tax. Some proponents have considered taxes as high as 0.25 per cent on a transaction,
referred to as 25 basis points, to discourage excess currency speculation. In contrast, a
rate of 1 or 2 basis points could be adopted for revenue-raising purposes. Such a global
tax could, it has been estimated, raise annual revenue around US$15 billion (tax of 1
basis point) or US$28 billion (2 basis points).
Much of the debate has revolved around the technical feasibility of the CTT. The
financial markets are continuously developing, with new financial instruments being
devised. The market structure is evolving with technological progress and in response to
competitive pressures and regulation. Even at rates of 1 or 2 basis points, the tax may
shift financial activity and encourage banking consolidation. These considerations lead
one to suggest that, if implemented, the CTT should be introduced cautiously with a
very low tax rate. The very high expectations raised in the past with respect to the
revenue contribution of a CTT are not as yet warranted. Moreover, the final
distributional effects, and the impact on real transactions, are hard to predict. We can
treat the CTT as an excise tax on all purchases according to their foreign exchange
content. Some transactions are particularly affected, notably the remittances from
emigrants discussed later.
Introduction of a CTT requires wide agreement. Whether it requires universal
agreement, and in particular the agreement of the United States, is actively debated.
Proposals have been made that the Tobin tax could be implemented by a group of
countries such as the EU plus Switzerland. Such an approach based on flexible
geometry may offer a way forward politically but it introduces a further element of
uncertainty regarding the impact of the tax. The effect on the euro-zone, and on
Europe’s financial centres of Frankfurt and London, is hard to predict. The financial
community tends only to see a loss of competitiveness, but if the tax performs its
original function of increasing stability, then the euro may become more attractive.
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A double dividend?
The standard analysis of tax incidence is based on examining a world of perfectly
competitive, perfectly functioning markets. In such a ‘first-best’ context, government
intervention—whatever its distributional advantages—has an efficiency cost. Real world
economies, however, are not characterized by perfect markets, and one of the major
contributions of modern public economics has been to explore the implications of
market failure. Both of the global taxes discussed above are in fact directed at improving
the allocation of resources. A tax on the consumption of goods that harm the
environment has a positive allocational effect, switching spending away from polluting
goods towards those causing less or no environmental damage. The currency
transactions tax was proposed to dampen destabilizing currency speculation.
Do we then have a ‘double dividend’? Global taxes can generate a double dividend in
two ways. If the new tax is seen as an alternative to ODA, then it can both make its own
efficiency contribution and allow a reduction in the taxes presently used to finance
ODA. Taxing air transport, for example, not only reduces the environmental damage of
tourism but also allows the income tax to be reduced. Taxing carbon may allow payroll
taxes to be reduced, leading to a fall in unemployment. There is an ‘employment
dividend’ as well as an ‘environmental dividend’. The second possibility is that the new
source is a net addition to development resources. In this case, the double dividend
consists of the reduced environmental damage and the benefit from achieving the
MDGs.
The double dividend idea appeals to the imagination. Two notes of caution should,
however, be entered. First, we have seen that the tax required for allocational reasons is
likely to be considerably higher than that needed to add significantly to development
funding. The carbon use tax can make a major contribution to raising revenue at a much
lower rate than that suggested as needed to halt global warming. (Taking this argument
to the limit, we may note that a carbon tax that reduced emissions to zero would be an
environmental success but a revenue failure.) The second caution concerns political
economy. Linking together two causes—saving the planet and funding the MDGs—may
appear to be building a stronger coalition of support. This argument is related to the
classic model of ‘log-rolling’ where two politicians agree to support each other’s
projects. However, the log-rolling model assumes a particular distribution of benefits
and losses from the projects, the former being concentrated and the latter diffused. But
the reverse may be true: the costs may be largely borne by a small interest group (such
as energy producers), and the benefits widely dispersed. To be more concrete, opening
up two fronts also invites attack from both directions, particularly if the two objectives
require taxes at very different levels.
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Special Drawing Rights for development
There has long been a campaign for the issue of development-focused Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund. The original purpose of SDRs was
to increase international liquidity, but attention has focused more recently on the
potential role of SDR creation in providing funds for development finance. Proponents,
such as George Soros, have argued that new SDRs should be created and that the
developed countries should re-allocate their share of the SDR issue to the funding of
global public goods and to supplementing aid flows to individual developing countries.
These calls have to be seen in a context where developing countries have been
accumulating substantial reserves in order to reduce their vulnerability to crises. To the
extent that these reserves are held in US government bonds, there is an obvious link
with the funding of US deficits. The Zedillo Panel argued that ‘substantial SDR
allocations might help shrink the US deficit while allowing other countries to continue
to build up the reserves they feel they need’.
An allocation of US$25-30 billion SDRs would represent a sizeable sum in relation to
the MDG funding needs. Its contribution would, however, depend on whether it is
repeated at regular intervals. Moreover, the contribution to development from SDR
creation has to be identified more precisely. The problem arises from the obligation to
make interest payments on the total allocation. If the obligation is transferred to the
recipient country or to a global public goods agency, then the financing amounts to a
low-interest loan. On the other hand, if the donor countries bear the interest cost, then it
would be equivalent to ODA. In the latter case, the advantage of the SDR route may be
questioned.
Issues also arise concerning governance. There needs to be greater clarity as to the
criteria by which the priorities for global public goods should be established, not least
because there are significant differences in the lists usually given.
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The UK International Finance Facility proposal
Innovation in the sphere of public finances has not always kept up with innovation in
private financial markets. Making use of the latter to enhance the effectiveness of ODA
is the essence of the recent proposal by the UK government for an International Finance
Facility (IFF). The IFF involves the creation of a new Facility, designed to achieve the
additional finance and to ensure effective use of the funds for development purposes.
The key elements in the proposal are:
• Significant increase in annual ODA for a limited duration, timed to achieve the
MDGs by 2015.
• A pre-commitment, so that the promises can be securitized.
• Allowing a substantial immediate increase in development spending.
The IFF would effectively ‘front load’ long-term aid flows.
The IFF has the advantage that it does not require universal agreement; it is an example
of the power of flexible geometry. The involvement of all rich countries is not required.
Providing only that sufficient like-minded countries participate, the IFF could generate
an increase in funds of the US$50 billion magnitude required. This assumes that the
sums pledged would be additional to those already being provided by donor countries.
To the extent that the IFF displaces existing aid, there would be the advantage of
ensuring a predictable and stable flow of aid, but the net gain would be much less
impressive in magnitude.
Providing that the donor commitments are achieved, the disbursement of funds from the
IFF would increase from US$10 billion in the first year to US$50 billion in five years,
remaining constant at that level for five years before declining to zero over the final five
years. The central aim of the IFF is indeed to change the time path of aid flows. This
may bring with it certain problems. Advancing disbursements raises issues of absorptive
capacity and the impact on the macro economies of recipient countries. The new Facility
builds in safeguards but a great deal may depend on domestic economic policies. The
other side of the coin is the subsequent scaling back of flows to zero. Extra donor
contributions (above the 2002 base) are projected to continue from 2020 to 2032, with
the entire sum allocated to debt servicing and replenishment of the IFF reserves.
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Private donations for international development
Charitable giving in rich countries is very substantial: in the US more than 1.5 per cent
of national income. People give, in addition, large amounts of free time. Development,
however, commands only a small share. A great deal of philanthropic activity in rich
countries is aimed at domestic concerns, although there are differences across countries,
with Germany being a country where a larger fraction goes to fund overseas
development. The amount raised by UNICEF national committees ranges from 9 US
cents per capita in New Zealand to nearly US$4 per capita in Luxembourg. Overall
giving in the US and the UK appears to be a larger proportion of total income for both
poor and rich households. At the upper end, there are a number of charitable foundations
with development interests, such as the Ford, Rockefeller, and, more recently, the UN
Foundation, set up by Ted Turner, and the Gates Foundation.
Present flows of private donations for development purposes are small when viewed in
relation to the needs of funding the MDGs, but they are significant for psychological
reasons. The example of individual citizens may encourage governments to be more
generous. It is, therefore, important to examine the potential for raising private
donations. We have, however, to recognize that development funding lacks many of the
features that attract charitable giving. It is concerned with long-term development rather
than urgent relief; it involves communities that are geographically distant, where there is
little direct contact; there is little scope for the volunteering of time. Possible policy
directions include; more generous tax incentives for donors, measures to encourage
payroll giving, the establishment of global funds to focus the attention of large private
donors, new forms of corporate giving, Internet giving, and donor education
programmes.
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Global lottery and global premium bond
The use of lotteries by national and local governments to raise funds for public sector
projects is now commonplace. World sales of gaming products are large: some US$120
billion per year. The idea of a global lottery to raise money for development has
received attention particularly on account of the recent proposal by the Crisis
Management Initiative, under the impetus of President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland. The
proposal is for national lotteries to run national versions of the global lottery game, with
part of the net proceeds being transferred into a global lottery fund to be run by the
United Nations or another agency. The net yield is hard to estimate, but could be around
US$6 billion a year.
The design of a global lottery faces the same issues as a national lottery, with regard to
its form (an instant product such as a scratch card or a regular draw such as Lotto) and
the prize structure. But there are additional matters to be resolved. In order to secure
acceptance by national lottery operators, and to avoid opposition from their
beneficiaries, it may be necessary to differentiate the prize structure: for example, by
reducing the size of the top prizes. This may lead to the global lottery offering different
rewards across countries, with the attendant problems of cross-border betting. The
market place has become even more crowded with the rapid growth of online gambling.
A global lottery will raise money from those who switch their loyalty from existing
lotteries and from new players, motivated by the use of funds for development purposes.
While empirical evidence suggests that low-income groups in developed countries
spend a larger proportion of their income on lottery products, the new players may be
drawn from higher up the income scale. It remains possible, however, that compared
with ODA financed though income tax, the global lottery is regressive in its effect on
the distribution of income in developed countries. But, compared with nothing (i.e.
lower development funding), it is likely to be progressive in terms of the world income
distribution.
A related but different idea is a global premium bond. This is a loan instrument where
the interest takes the form of a lottery prize, the capital being repayable on request.
Premium bondholders never lose their investment but the return depends on their luck.
In fact, the premium bond is financially equivalent as a transaction to placing money in
a regular savings bank and drawing out the interest each month to buy lottery tickets.
But experience in the UK suggests that this appeals to a different market, with the
middle- and upper-income groups participating, whereas they do not play the national
lottery. This may in part be explained by differences in the prize structure and in the tax
treatment, but it may also reflect a difference in perception. A global premium bond may
also attract those who wish to lend for development purposes (the same function could
of course be performed by a conventional savings bond for development). The scale of
loan finance permitted by issuing global premium bonds is very difficult to estimate, but
this novel idea seems well worth pursuing further.
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Increasing remittances by emigrants
Remittances from migrants are a market-based external source of development finance,
which have, according to published estimates, increased steadily from around US$15
billion in 1980 to US$80 billion in 2002. These are large flows, second only to foreign
direct investment as a component of external resource flows to developing countries. To
an important extent, remittances finance consumption, and may be seen as an instrument
of global redistribution: an international mechanism of social protection. But they are
also a source of finance for capital formation, providing community infrastructure (such
as schools) and funds for the financing of new enterprises. Remittances are channelled
through a variety of financial entities, ranging from the formal to the highly informal,
and the latter may not be fully reflected in the official statistics quoted above.
There are several different motivations for remittances. Transfers may be made because
the migrant wishes to help family members who have stayed at home; transfers may be a
form of saving, providing for a later return home; there may be repayment of loans that
allowed the migrant to study and travel abroad; and emigration may be part of a co-
insurance strategy, with remittances being made when the migrant is successful and the
family at home guaranteeing support in the case of failure. The balance of these different
motives will affect the likely time path of remittances over the life-cycle of the
migration process, and the extent to which remittances augment savings as opposed to
consumption.
The most obvious means to increase the scale of remittances is via policies to reduce the
cost of sending money. Many migrants face difficulties accessing bank services; the
bank services are not well tailored to their needs. Competition could increase bank
receptiveness to the requirements of migrants, and measures can be taken to facilitate
entry into the money transfer business, such as reducing license costs. It is, however,
hard to predict the quantitative impact of such measures; and it must be recognized that
a number of the measures run counter to the recent trend to tighten regulation, so as to
counteract money-laundering and the finance of terrorism.
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TOWARDS NEW FUNDING
Our conclusions
Our objective in this report is to determine the contribution of new funding sources to
financing the MDGs. Many of the proposals have multiple objectives. The creation of
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was first proposed to ease problems of international
liquidity, but here we are concerned with their potential role for development purposes.
The Tobin tax was first proposed as a means of coping with financial volatility; here we
are primarily concerned with its potential as a generator of revenue to be used to finance
development.
Our main conclusions concerning the new sources of funding are summarized in
Table 1. The first conclusion is that the two global taxes considered could yield revenue
of the magnitude required (tax on carbon use) or at least half of the requirement (Tobin
tax at a rate of 2 basis points). Moreover, the tax rates required for this purpose are an
order of magnitude smaller than the tax rates proposed by those advocating these taxes
on allocational grounds. The Tobin taxes proposed to reduce excessive currency
speculation have been of the order of 10 or 20 basis points—ten times that considered
here. The energy tax considered here has a rate of a tenth or a twentieth of those
typically considered in the literature on global warming. The taxes are not, therefore,
guaranteed to have the major behavioural impact, discouraging pollution and
speculation, which has been sought. This conclusion has both negative and positive
aspects. On the minus side, it means that the double dividend—of increased revenue
plus improved functioning of the economy—may fall short on the latter dimension. But
it is revenue that is our concern here. The second aspect is positive, which is that the
much more modest tax rates envisaged here are more acceptable and less likely to have
disruptive economic consequences.
The second conclusion is that there are alternatives to global taxation. The International
Finance Facility (IFF) proposed by the UK government could, if it attracts sufficient
support from other major donors, yield flows over the crucial period up to 2015 of the
magnitude required. (At the same time, it is open to question how far this differs at heart
from a commitment to expand ODA.) The creation of SDRs for development purposes
has been envisaged as raising some US$25-30 billion. This means that it could
contribute a significant part of the total, but would need to be combined with other
measures, particularly if such allocations were made less frequently than annually. One
such additional source is the global lottery, which is potentially the source of significant
revenues, if agreement can be reached with national lotteries. A global premium bond
could provide a flow of loan funding not otherwise available. Supporting roles could be
played by increased remittances from emigrants, and, on a more modest scale, increased
private donations.
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In each case, however, we have to consider the extent of additionality. The third
conclusion is that there is a distinct risk of crowding out. Countries signing up to the IFF
may implicitly offset this commitment against their regular ODA. The same may apply
to countries that transfer any new SDR allocation. Agreement to the introduction of a
global tax may mean that governments feel less pressure to increase their ODA, or that
firms are less likely to contribute to charitable funding of development. Measures to
stimulate private donations may adversely affect other forms of giving. Issuing a global
premium bond may crowd out other borrowing for development purposes, although this
is less likely if it is targeted at the individual investor.
How far do the proposals have other advantages apart from the revenue raised? As
already noted, the proposed tax rates are much lower than those advocated for other
purposes, but both energy use and currency transactions taxes have potential to act as
corrective taxes. There is an allocational benefit rather than a deadweight loss. In the
same way, tax incentives to private donations and remittances by emigrants may act to
encourage an activity that is undersupplied, a gift benefiting the recipient as well as the
sender. The fourth conclusion is that there are possible double dividends, but they are a
by-product not the primary rationale of the proposals. The double dividend argument
should not be over-sold.
The existence of a double dividend does not mean that there is no cost. With an ordinary
tax, the burden of a tax generating US$1 billion can be said to consist of two parts: the
US$1 billion that taxpayers hand over, and the additional deadweight cost (excess
burden) due to the distortion of economic decisions. Where there is a double dividend,
the second element becomes a benefit: decisions are improved by the corrective tax. But
the first element remains: revenue is still raised. There are good reasons to expect that
the taxes will be passed on to final users. This applies to energy taxes, where we have to
follow through the full input-output implications. People tend to think immediately of
the impact of a carbon tax on the fuel and transport costs of households, but energy costs
enter also as inputs in other sectors. The operating costs of the financial sector, for
example, will be increased, so that part may appear as higher prices for apparently
unrelated products. In the case of the Tobin tax, one disadvantage of the tax is that the
final incidence is not easily determined. Part of the burden may well fall on developing
countries: for instance if the tax reduces the effective flow of remittances from
emigrants. The other measures too may have costs. The increase in ODA that is
effectively envisaged under the IFF has to be financed, and the future commitments may
affect the budgetary position of donor countries. Tax relief for remittances by emigrants
has a cost to the host countries. The fifth conclusion is that it is illusory to suppose that
simply adopting an alternative funding route avoids all costs.
In considering both double dividends and cost burdens, one important consideration is
the impact on the macroeconomy. It is the specific purpose of some measures, such as
the creation of SDRs, to stimulate the world economy. Given significant unemployment,
and under-use of productive capacity, it may be possible to generate new resources at
little or no real cost. Donor countries may, via the IFF, be able to engage in borrowing in
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a way that acts as a macroeconomic stimulus. In the opposite direction, a significant
increase in funding for development may run into absorption problems. Here, we have
not attempted to assess these macroeconomic arguments, but they are potentially
important. A sixth conclusion is that the policy towards funding the MDGs has to be
seen in conjunction with stimulating the global economy and with an eye to the
absorption issue.
The way forward
The final column in Table 1 lists the main obstacles to the proposals. This naturally
leads one to ask how they can be overcome. This is in part a question of design to make
the case for the new sources more compelling. In the case of the global lottery, for
instance, the prize structure can be constructed in a way that helps differentiate the
product from that of national lotteries and to avoid the possibly negative effects of
astronomical prizes. We have described ways of increasing the efficiency of the market
for remittances. Any realistic programme is likely to consist of a package of measures.
While a carbon tax alone might be sufficient to raise the required funds, this is not true
of the other proposals considered here. Such a package could be constructed by the UN
and other international agencies, which would monitor its introduction.
Overcoming the obstacles is, however, primarily a matter for political action. Who are
the key actors? To begin with, there is an essential role for the individual citizen.
Individuals can contribute significantly both by their private support and by their
influence on governments. Individuals make generous donations to charity, but
relatively little goes to development purposes. We have seen how there is considerable
scope for the globalization of charitable giving. Increased support for development
charities serves both the direct purpose of helping poor countries and the indirect
purpose of demonstrating to governments of rich countries the concerns of their voters.
National governments are indeed crucial. First, they have considerable independent
impact. Acting alone, the government of a rich country can take steps to increase the
flows of finance for development. A single country could, for example, allow income
tax deductions for taxpayers sending remittances to fund community projects in the
home country. A single country could launch a premium bond dedicated to development
funding. A single country could decide to allocate to development purposes part of the
proceeds from its national lottery. A single country could match out of public funds
the amounts donated by its citizens to development charities.
Matching also applies at the international level, and governments may be more willing
to provide funding where other countries are also participating. The logic of the
International Finance Facility is that a number of countries join together in making the
commitment. This brings us to the class of proposals where common action is required
but it is sufficient for a significant subset of countries to agree. This includes the IFF and
the global lottery. Finally, there are those proposals where the involvement of all donor
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countries is effectively necessary. This includes the creation of new SDRs and
(probably) the carbon tax.
Our focus has been on the role of high-income countries, but our report is not only
directed at these countries. Middle-income countries are becoming increasingly
significant as potential sources of development funding. There is much that developing
countries can do to facilitate the effective enactment of the proposals considered here
and to take forward the necessary dialogue.
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